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Much has been written about the phenomenon of ever-increasing executive pay in listed 
companies.  This paper examines some of the underlying reasons for this continued 
increase in executive directors’ remuneration.  It reports the results of 40 interviews with 
protagonists in the remuneration debate in FTSE 350 companies, exploring the types of 
change made and the reasons given for these changes. This issue has not specifically been 
addressed by previous studies. 
 
Reasons given for making changes included: increases due to being below market; 
changing performance-related schemes that did not pay out or paid less than the 
anticipated amount; changes in the company's culture or strategy; changes to senior 
personnel (executive and non-executive); compliance with good human resources 
practice; and a perceived need to comply with best practice in corporate governance. 
 
The results are analysed through two theoretical lenses.  An agency theory explanation 
provides insight into the structure of executive remuneration contracts, and expectancy 
theory suggests why schemes might be changed to motivate the executives.  The 
expectancy theory explanation tempers the agency theory explanation, showing why 
changes are made even though this may lead to moral hazard. 
 
 
 
The financial support of the P D Leake Trust (a charity associated with the ICAEW) is 
gratefully acknowledged.  The Centre for Business Performance manages all grant 
applications. 
 
Onwards and Upwards:  Why Companies Change their 
Executive Remuneration Schemes, and Why This Leads to 
Increases in Pay 
 
 
1  Introduction 
Much has been written about the large increase in executive pay over the last decade in 
the United States (US)  (e.g. Bebchuk and Grinstein, 2005) and the United Kingdom 
(UK) (e.g. Deloitte,  2005).  This rise has come about due to the absolute increases in 
levels of salary, and also from a change in the structure of packages, with a 
proportionately higher level of variable pay being available.  Explanations given for this 
phenomenon include an over-reliance on size-based surveys, leading to a ratcheting up of 
pay levels (Jensen, Murphy and Wruck, 2004; Ezzamel and Watson, 2002) and the 
increase in importance of complex equity-based compensation schemes (Bebchuk and 
Grinstein, 2005;  Buck, et al.,  2003). This paper adds to the body of work in this area by 
examining, in a UK context, some of the underlying reasons for this continued increase in 
executive directors’ remuneration.  This is done from two theoretical perspectives:  
agency theory and expectancy theory. 
 
The use of these theoretical perspectives ties in with the two roles of the non-executive 
director (NED) as discussed by many authors, including Ezzamel and Watson (1997) and 
McNulty et al (2003).  The NEDs, who sit on the remuneration committees that 
determine remuneration, have roles both as monitors, interested in conformance to 
governance regulation, and as strategists, focusing on business performance.  Both of 
these roles are important, but their demands are different.   
 
The governance role of NEDs in relation to executive remuneration is explored through 
an agency theory lens, considering how pay is structured to align executives’ actions with 
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the needs of shareholders.  Examination of the performance role is done using an 
expectancy theory perspective, looking at how the pay structure motivates the executives 
to make decisions or take actions in line with the business strategy.   
 
In examining the reasons why executive pay appears to be continually increasing this 
study takes the results of interview-based research in selected FTSE 350 companies, and 
examines the reasons given in the companies for making changes to their remuneration 
schemes and practices.  Interviews were conducted at 12 companies:  each of them had 
made significant changes to its remuneration over a period of a few years, and some had 
made many such changes.  Those changes reflected issues relating to corporate 
performance (for example executive motivation, changes in company strategy or culture) 
and changes relating to corporate governance (for example, changing schemes to be in 
line with best practice).  In no case did those changes appear to reduce the actual or 
potential remuneration of executives.   
 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 explains the structure of executive 
remuneration schemes used in the UK and sets out the theoretical backgrounds against 
which the results of this study are set.  Section 3 explains the research approach adopted 
in this study.  This is followed in section 4 by a presentation of the findings of the 
research:  how elements of the schemes changed, and the reasons given by the 
interviewees for these changes.  The findings are discussed in section 5, and section 6 
concludes. 
 
 
2  Background 
Executive pay in the UK 
The remuneration package of an executive director of a UK listed company generally 
comprises base salary, an annual bonus (possibly including a deferred element) and one 
or more long-term awards, plus pension arrangements and perks (New Bridge Street, 
   2
2004a and 2004b).  The long-term awards will take the form either of options, or of 
share-based long term incentive plans (ltips).  Until very recently, when pensions became 
an issue of public debate, most of the attention of academics (Murphy, 1999:  2517;  
Werner and Ward, 2004:  217) and investors has been on the salary and the variable 
awards (bonus, options and ltips) probably due to the fact that these have been reported in 
most detail, and are most easily understood.  In line with this academic tradition, this 
paper treats remuneration as comprising the salary and variable pay elements, excluding 
pension and perks.  
 
Salary is the fixed element of the package, the others being variable.  Two factors 
influence the level of variable pay an executive receives.  The first is the way that the 
elements of variable pay are set as a function of salary (e.g. potential bonus being up to 
80% of annual salary;  options award being up to 150% of salary).  The second factor 
affecting the amount of pay received is whether, and to what extent, the executive 
achieves the targets set for the variable pay:  lower performance will result in a reduced 
bonus.  For example, in a scheme where the maximum potential bonus is 80% of salary, 
an executive might receive an actual award, based on performance, of 50%.  What is 
significant to the executive is the amount of pay actually awarded, not just the upper 
limit.  Thus, in considering the overall level of executive pay, attention needs to be paid 
to each element of the package, and to both targets and achieved results.   
 
 
Theoretical approaches  
In examining why companies make changes to their executive remuneration schemes, 
two theoretical lenses have been adopted, from different perspectives but having aspects 
in common.  These are agency theory, which is an economics-based approach, and 
expectancy theory, a process theory of motivation which reflects a social-psychological 
approach.  Eisenhardt (1989:  71) suggests that agency theory provides a partial view of 
the world, and that using it with complementary perspectives helps capture the 
complexity of organisations.  Agency theory explains why the board, acting on behalf of 
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the shareholders, seeks for governance reasons to use executive remuneration contracts 
that are performance-related;  expectancy theory suggests how that variable pay might 
motivate individual performance.  
 
Much of the literature that discusses executive pay uses an agency theory approach.  This 
theory, which arises from the separation of ownership and management (Berle and 
Means, 1932), is developed and discussed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama (1980) 
and Eisenhardt (1989), amongst others.  It relates to the differences in motivation and 
payoff between the shareholders (the principals who own the firm) and the executive 
directors (the agents to whom is delegated its day to day running).  Proponents of agency 
theory see the remuneration contract as a way to mitigate this potential conflict of 
interest.  By relating executive remuneration to an appropriate measure of performance, 
shareholders have some means of ensuring that executives behave in their (i.e. the 
shareholders’) interests.  Thus performance-related contracts, that measure outcomes 
rather than behaviours, are seen as a useful mechanism.  By having their reward linked to 
suitable performance measures, executives should be motivated to perform in areas seen 
as important by the board and shareholders.  A greater link between pay and performance 
implies greater alignment.  However, as Hodak (2005:  116) points out, the fact that a 
package aligns, does not mean that it motivates. 
 
Implicit in the agency theory approach is the assumption that linking pay to performance 
will in fact motivate the executives to perform.  In examining how this motivation of 
executives might be effected, expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964;  Pinder, 1987;  Lawler, 
1991) states that if variable pay is to act as a motivator then (a) the individual has to 
expect that by exerting effort s/he will be able to meet the targets set;  and (b) that 
meeting the targets will result in receiving the reward, which (c) s/he believes is worth 
having.  Proponents of expectancy theory argue that an individual’s effort will be based 
on his/her expectation of the probability of success (expectancy) and the attractiveness of 
the final outcome (the value of the reward).  The theory suggests that it is the individual’s 
perception of the link between effort and performance, and between performance and 
reward that is important.  The individual must understand that link and feel confident that 
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by adapting their performance in the direction suggested by the performance management 
system, they will be able to achieve the goals and thus receive the reward. 
 
Because expectancy theory relates to individuals’ perceptions, a significant aspect of the 
theory is that it explicitly recognises the differing preferences of individuals, and 
implicitly assumes that differently structured packages might be appropriate in different 
contexts. 
 
From the above, it can be seen that both agency theory and expectancy theory have at 
their heart the assumption that an individual can be motivated into certain actions by the 
opportunity to receive a reward.  It is for the designer of the contract (agency theory) or 
the performance management system (expectancy theory) to ensure that the performance 
criteria set are appropriate for the company’s objectives and the individual’s capabilities.  
These are the assumptions underlying the use of performance-related pay.  From the 
remuneration committee’s point of view, contracts have to be set so as to comply with 
relevant governance regulations and ‘best practice’, and to manage the individuals’ 
requirements.  This can result in a tension for the NEDs trying to reconcile these two 
imperatives (Spira and Bender, 2004). 
 
 
3  Research approach 
This study examined how executive directors’ pay was determined in selected UK listed 
companies.  It was an exploratory study, adopting a multiple case approach as suggested 
by Yin (1994).  As others have pointed out (Stiles, 2001;  Pettigrew, 1992) much of the 
research on boards of directors has used archival sources, at one remove from the 
participants themselves.  This work focuses on the views of the individuals, by means of 
semi-structured face-to-face interviews with protagonists in the remuneration-setting 
process in FTSE 350 companies.   
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A perennial problem with research amongst elites is obtaining access, and a certain 
amount of opportunism in sample selection is inevitable (Silverman, 2001: 249;  Perkins 
and Hendry, 2005).  For this study, the case companies were obtained in several ways.   
 
Initially, a sample was taken from the PricewaterhouseCoopers Corporate Register (a 
commercial database of companies and directors).  Companies from the utilities sectors 
and the finance sectors were selected from the database, and those with ‘good 
governance’  (i.e. not obviously breaching any governance guidelines) were listed1.  The 
companies selected from this list were those where the directors (executive or non-
executive) sat on the remuneration committees of more than one company, the thought 
being that interviewing such individuals would produce richer results.  25 companies 
were approached by telephone contact, of which six agreed to participate.  The sample 
was extended through contact with a group of executive remuneration professionals in 
FTSE 100 companies, to whom details of the research were circulated.  Four other 
companies joined the research through that process, with the final two arising due to 
individuals at those companies expressed interest in a paper presenting some early results 
of the research (Bender, 2003). 
 
Table 1 sets out details of the corporate interviewees.  
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
As well as the corporate interviewees, interviews were conducted with an institutional 
representative, headhunters, a group of remuneration professionals, and a focus group 
                                                 
1 Four of the companies were from the utilities sector, this emphasis on utilities being part of the research 
design.  Utilities in the UK have an interesting position as regards directors’ remuneration – it was the high 
pay and option awards made to directors of the newly-privatised utilities that led to the ‘fat cat’ debate 
which resulted in the Greenbury report of 1995.  Further, utilities are governed by regulators, who 
determine the prices they can charge, such that a utility’s potential for economic profit is reset at zero every 
five years, in order to drive future efficiencies.  These various factors make utilities an interesting context 
in which to examine executive pay in the UK.  The original research plan was to investigate utilities and 
finance companies, the latter being chosen as an example of an industry where pay is much higher than 
utilities, and structured with a higher performance-related element.  Early in the fieldwork, it was realised 
that the remuneration-setting process in finance companies was no different to that in other industries, and 
this industry requirement was relaxed. 
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brought together to discuss the results of the research.  In all, 40 individual and group 
interviews were conducted, between 2001 and 2003.  The interviews, which lasted on 
average one hour, were taped and transcribed.  
 
A standard interview agenda was adopted, although the approach was flexible, and the 
interviews were very wide-ranging.  The interview protocol addressed three main areas: 
 
 (A) Your thoughts on the debate about the level and structure of executive directors’ 
remuneration  (6 questions addressing issues of level and structure, performance 
and motivation);    
(B) How the company arrived at its remuneration policies  (11 questions addressing 
the conduct of committee meetings, the roles of the different parties, matters 
considered and then rejected, time lines of decisions, comparative pay throughout 
the organisation);  and  
(C) How the company’s remuneration policies compare to other companies of which 
you are aware  (3 questions addressing level and structure of pay, and ‘good’ or 
‘bad’ practice).   
 
Interviewees were also asked to complete a short questionnaire, ranking the various 
factors that might impact on their pay decisions (e.g.  company size, profitability, 
strategy, individual director needs, etc.) 
 
In addition to the interviews, documentation such as remuneration committee meeting 
minutes and consultants’ reports was obtained from five of the companies (the others 
would not make such information available).  Furthermore, financial statements (which 
include the published remuneration reports) were obtained for all companies for the 
preceding, current and immediately subsequent years.   
 
The interview transcripts and company documents were analysed with the help of NVivo 
to manage the data.  These documents were coded to reflect what was happening in the 
companies, and the theoretical perspectives that this reflected.   
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4  Findings:  changes to schemes 
Almost every working individual will experience some changes in their pay and 
conditions every year, as part of an annual progression.  For the purpose of this research, 
‘change’ was defined more explicitly than this.  Levels of pay that moved in line with 
market conditions or with promotion were not treated as changes, but increases (there 
were no decreases) considerably above market levels were included.  Amendments to the 
variable pay policies and packages were all defined as changes for this research, as 
normally one would expect the status quo to apply, and schemes would continue 
unchanged each year.  Thus such amendments, in response to an outside stimulus, were 
examined. 
 
Discussion with the interviewees focused on changes made to policies and packages 
within the current or preceding year, expect in one company where the interviewees were 
anxious also to discuss significant changes which had taken place five years previously.    
Within the twelve companies, some had undertaken a complete review of their executive 
remuneration structures whilst others had just changed one aspect of their pay.   
 
The changes were all implemented by the companies’ remuneration committees, as is 
required under the Combined Code (2003).  However, in some instances it was clear that 
the remuneration committee had itself initiated the change;  in some it was apparent that 
the review was initiated by the executives;  and in some instances it was not clear from 
the interviews how the change had arisen. 
 
Before commenting on the changes, it is useful to set out details of what was done, and 
by whom.  Table 2 summarises the main changes that were made to the schemes, 
showing the number of companies to which they related.   
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
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 In addition to the above, three of the companies were undertaking major reviews of their 
remuneration practices at the time of the research fieldwork.  The outcomes of those 
reviews are not known2. 
 
It is notable that all of the changes indicated above, except the shareholding requirement, 
have the potential to increase the overall level of executive pay.  Some automatically led 
to a rise.  Others, for example the additional bonus potential, could lead to such an 
increase, although some of the companies also changed their performance targets at the 
same time, making direct comparison difficult.  Nevertheless, these changes are one 
explanation for why published surveys of executive pay continually show significant 
growth in remuneration (e.g. Taylor, 2005). 
 
Table 3 sets out in more detail how these changes related to the individual case 
companies.  Table 4 relates this information on changes made to the stimuli for making 
those changes. 
 
 
TABLES 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
As stated, none of the changes led directly to a decrease in executive pay:  all except the 
shareholding requirement appeared to result in an actual or potential increase.  This was 
reflected, indirectly, in a comment of one of the interviewees discussing why the changes 
to their scheme had taken place when they did, and not several years earlier. 
As far as options is concerned, options had been very popular with management, as 
you can imagine, during a period of a constantly rising share price, and no 
performance conditions attached to them.  And I think that it would have been a very 
brave management that would decide to take away something that was delivering 
significant rewards to people and replace it … 
Company secretary 
                                                 
2 Although the remuneration reports of those companies have since become available, the scheme detail 
(e.g. bonus measures and targets) is not published. 
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 A change that deliberately reduced executives’ actual or potential earnings would be 
unpopular and very unusual – no such changes were noted.  However, occasional changes 
which reduced one part of remuneration were seen in the case companies – for example 
in one company when an option scheme was introduced to run alongside an existing ltip, 
the potential payout on the ltip was reduced in order that the incentives overall were not 
unreasonable when compared to the market.  Also, in some cases interviewees reported 
that a change to a higher bonus potential was accompanied by tougher performance 
targets, making the ultimate pay outcome difficult to prejudge.  (As detailed information 
on bonus measures and targets is not disclosable, this could not always be verified.) 
 
Some of the changes made were significant, and came about as the result of an extensive 
review.  Other changes, such as adapting performance measures or increasing bonus 
levels, were considered (by the parties and the researcher) to be more minor.  The 
explanations given by the interviewees for making the changes, as set out in Tables 3 and 
4, are discussed in the next section. 
 
 
The Stimuli For Change 
There were many different stimuli for change.  The analyses in Tables 3 and 4 set out 
some detail of these;  here they are summarised under broad headings, to show the key 
themes. 
 
Market-related changes 
Executive pay is set based on market comparators, for both the level of salary and the 
levels of bonus and long term award (Bender 2004a).  Several of the case companies 
made changes (for example, increasing the level of salary or bonus) because their existing 
schemes were considered to be below market.  In only one of the companies was it 
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specifically stated that being ‘below market’ had led to executive dissatisfaction;  there 
was generally just a desire to remain in line with ‘the market’. 
The thing was that we hadn't had to recruit anybody into those senior positions for a 
long time.  Everybody had been in post for quite a number of years.  So there was 
never a need to test whether those levels were attractive to get people in.  So we 
adjusted those, and we adjusted certain other things, for example things like cars.  
…   I mean, the whole thing... the bonus scheme was pretty poor in terms of the 
potential rewards.  There was a share option scheme at the time, but no ltip.  So all 
in all it was the whole remuneration package was a long way out of line with the rest 
of the world. 
Company chairman 
 
Many commentators (e.g. Murphy, 1999:  2497;  Hall, 2002) have pointed out that a 
desire by all companies to pay at market median or above will lead automatically to that 
median ratcheting up every year.  Although some have warned against this practice (e.g. 
Higgs, 2003:  B1.2), none has explained how companies are to avoid the situation, whilst 
still remaining competitive in the labour market. 
 
Market factors related not just to the level of salaries, but also to the level of bonus award 
available for on-target and maximum performance.  The level of performance-related pay 
(PRP) used by UK companies, on both short- and long-term schemes, is increasing (New 
Bridge Street, 2004a, 2004b).  This partly reflects the ratchet effect discussed above, but 
in part it is due to the requirements of good governance.  The Combined Code, as revised 
in 2003, states that a “significant proportion of executive directors’ remuneration should 
be structured so as to link rewards to corporate and individual performance”.  This 
requirement ups the ante from the previous version of the Code, which required merely 
that “a proportion” of pay be so structured.  In increasing the amount of variable pay, it 
might have been expected that companies would reduce the level of base salary to 
compensate:  this does not appear to have happened, possibly because additional variable 
pay means that the executives are taking more pay-risk, and the overall level of package 
needs to be increased to compensate for that risk (Core et al., 2005).  That is the 
implication of one discussion: 
…and had made the decision at that time that we wanted pay to be median for a few 
reasons.  One, we actually wanted to ensure that we did introduce this element of 
variable pay to incentivise people, and therefore we wanted to ensure that we paid 
   11
everybody a fair rate for the job, but that those who achieved most had the ability to 
increase their reward.   
HR professional 
 
Here, the company paid median, in order to be fair to its employees.  It introduced a 
highly incentivised package, giving plenty upside if performance were good.  However, 
overall the package was expected to be above median, as the executives were expected to 
earn their bonuses.  
 
Companies made these increases to performance-related pay levels, both short-and long-
term as they saw other companies increasing the potential awards. 
Well the reason we’re increasing it [long-term incentive] is that we think the market 
place again has gone more towards a greater than 100% basic.   
HR professional 
 
Thus the level of base pay and performance-related multiple rose continually.  In a 
presentation of early research findings to a group of remuneration professionals, one of 
them commented, somewhat cynically, “What you won’t find is we’re chasing each other 
downwards”.  They agreed that ‘the market’ against which they benchmarked was 
affected by the high end comparators, and influenced by leakage from (higher) US 
norms. 
 
 
Changing schemes because they do not pay out 
In addition to changes made if the scheme parameters were below market, all of the 
utilities, and two other companies had made changes because the performance-related 
schemes had not paid out, or had paid less than the anticipated payout3.   
 
                                                 
3 For example, one bonus scheme was changed because the anticipated payout of about 40% of salary had 
turned out for several years to be an actual payout of about 15%-20% of salary.  The performance measures 
and targets were unchanged, but the effective payout limit was doubled by adding a share-match to the 
annual bonus, with no additional performance conditions. 
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In making these changes, the argument put forward was that the schemes (either short-
term or long-term or both) were “not working”, and so they needed to be amended.  In 
some cases this does not seem unreasonable – for regulated utilities, whose profits are 
reduced by the regulatory review, targets set several years earlier would be unattainable. 
Well, basically the reason we decided that it needed to change was because the 
commercial environment in which we are operating had changed significantly due to 
the last price reviews in [utility sector], to the extent that it was impossible to pay out 
anything at all under the ltip because [performance measure] could never be 
achieved.  Because the income of the company had been reduced by about 25%.  
Therefore you are on a loser.  And so with that background it was decided that we 
needed to introduce another ltip, another long-term incentive scheme which had the 
potential to pay out and would have different tests… 
Committee chairman 
 
All of the utilities in the sample had made changes to their schemes for reasons related to 
their not paying out.  In one of the other companies, in a technology-related sector where 
industry conditions had changed dramatically over the previous few years, a review was 
underway to revise schemes because they were “so far out of the water” that no payout 
was ever likely to take place.  The HR professional explained the change in scheme as 
follows: 
… but then if you look at where they are paid.  In terms of the way the market has been 
going, the consensus that came from the experts has been that ours are far too ambitious. 
HR professional 
 
In considering whether a scheme does not pay out sufficiently, it is important that the 
parameters are clearly specified.  This was illustrated in the following quotation.  
I think the main thing which came out of it was that there was a complete 
misunderstanding or mismatch of what the short-term bonus was there to achieve.  
In the sense that we had designed, we the committee, had designed the short-term 
bonus on the basis that only 50% payout would be achieved for the expected 
performance.  Whereas clearly in the mind set of the executive, they wanted 100 
percent every year.  And they hadn't really appreciated that our design was 
designed for an average payout of 50%. …  They thought that if they got less than 
100 percent, something was wrong.  Whereas we think if they get more than 50 
percent on average, something is wrong! 
Committee chairman 
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The above-mentioned scheme was not changed;  executives’ expectations were managed 
down in a series of discussions with the remuneration committee chairman. 
 
Bender (2004b), in a review of why companies use PRP, reported that many interviewees 
argued that variable pay may not motivate.  However, they all argued that a lack of pay 
can demotivate (as discussed by Herzberg, 1968).  This reason was specifically given for 
the changes in some schemes.  An interviewee in one company whose share options were 
considerably underwater commented that the options being out-of-the money was a 
significant demotivator. 
…  if they are miles underwater the disincentive - it's not as if it's neutral, it's actually 
almost a negative. 
Company secretary 
 
Changes in the schemes for reasons relating to non-payment included changes to the level 
of short-term award available, to performance measures and targets, and to the type of 
long-term scheme.   From the interviews, it was very clear that both executives and non-
executives, and the consultants who advised them, felt that schemes that did not pay out 
were not working, and needed to be changed.  It was suggested to some of the 
interviewees (following an agency theory point of view) that if a scheme did not pay out, 
that meant that the executives had not performed sufficiently well, and so did not deserve 
a payment.  For example, it could be argued that it is the role of utility executives to 
negotiate an appropriate agreement with the regulator, and so their pay parameters should 
not be changed if the review is penal.  This, perhaps, is a bit harsh, and although one 
NED hinted at it, none of the companies implemented this:  the feeling was that it was not 
a very helpful way to approach matters.   
 
Figure 1 illustrates ways in which the case companies altered their plans, or considered 
altering them, in the light of shortfalls in bonus payment. 
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Figure 1    The pay-performance relationship in conditions of poor performance 
Expected relationship 
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Changes in the company 
Given the old adage ‘you get what you pay for’, it is important that a company’s 
performance measures and targets are appropriate.  Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992) and 
Montemayor (1996) suggest that companies are more likely to succeed when HR 
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policies, including remuneration, are aligned with the organisation’s operations.  
Similarly, Rajagopalan (1997) illustrated how different remuneration strategies were 
appropriate to companies following different strategies.  Company strategy is an 
important input into the design of schemes, and changing the remuneration scheme was 
seen as a fundamental part of changing the strategy – the performance measures and 
targets could be seen as symbols of the required commercial change.   
 
In line with the above, many of the changes discussed with the participants came about 
because of fundamental changes, or desired changes, in the company’s strategy, culture 
or organisation.  For example, in some companies the schemes were changed because the 
company was developing a new line of business, for which the existing scheme 
parameters were not appropriate.  In some companies there was a need to drive a 
‘performance culture’ through the organisation, and the change in executive pay was both 
a driver of this and a symbol of the need for change.  Another related reason for changing 
the remuneration scheme was given by one company where the schemes lower down the 
organisation had been changed to include more of a performance-related element (again, 
as part of a culture change) and so it was felt that executive schemes needed changing 
too, to mirror this and reinforce the message. 
There was a recognition among the executive that if we were going to change 
direction, then remuneration had to be reviewed as part of that change of direction. 
HR professional 
 
We all, I think, began to reflect the view that the incentives needed to change, to 
meet both our aspirations and the changing shape of the business. 
HR professional 
 
What we’ve arrived at here is a management team in [company] that is committed to 
the strategy and understands that the only way that strategy will be delivered is if we 
change the culture, and we can start to drive a performance culture into the 
business.   
Committee chairman 
 
This last quote illustrates the importance of the remuneration policies matching the 
desired culture of the company.  Again, several of the participants mentioned the need to 
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change remuneration as a signal throughout the organisation that a culture change was 
required.   
So we said well we've got to change this culture, and we will want to bring in people 
who will really, very strongly, feel as if they own the results that we're shooting for.  
Now we then said, okay, that has got to go hand-in-hand with a pay practice that 
recognises the fact that we've got, that we want to attract people who feel very good 
about being personally rewarded for over-achievement, and who are ready to accept 
the fact that maybe there's going to be bad years in which they will want to suffer 
with the company for bad results achieved.   
CEO 
 
This reflects the findings of Kessler and Purcell (1992), who discussed the use of PRP in 
a utility to create a performance-driven culture. 
 
Changes of personnel 
The findings presented so far have implied that the schemes a company selects are a 
rational function of its business environment and needs.  Whilst these have a significant 
impact, other, more idiosyncratic, factors are also involved.  In some companies changes 
to schemes were put forward as a result of changes in personnel.  In one, a change in the 
remuneration committee membership led to a review of policies.  The incoming chairman 
of another company insisted that practices be tightened up so that he would not have to 
justify non-conforming policies to critical institutional shareholders.  And in several 
companies the arrival of a new CEO or new executives led to changes in the schemes.  In 
some cases this was so that the new CEO’s strategy would be reflected in the 
remuneration policies: 
Although, having just appointed a new chief executive, he is having a strong input as 
to what he would like to see in terms of a remuneration package which would 
underpin his strategy.  Because we’ve just appointed [name] as the chief executive, 
and he's coming up with a new strategic approach, which we welcome.  And we also 
asked him to consider the sort of remuneration systems and packages that would 
underpin what he wants to achieve from a strategic point of view. 
NED 
 
Another reason was that schemes needed to be made attractive to incoming executives:  
Because what happened of course was that the kind of people who were in the 
executive team were changing, they had different expectations from the ones who 
had been previously on the board when I first came, when they were mainly 
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[company] old hands who had come up through the system and were sort of 
programmed to a certain kind of reward. 
Committee chairman 
 
However, in one instance the arrival of the new CEO meant the departure of the old one, 
who had been blocking a scheme change: 
Well I think it also depends on the personalities.  The previous year we'd had [name] 
as the CEO, and he is not actually very strongly in favour of personal objectives.  So 
when he was the CEO he fought against having them.  So he was literally linked to 
the group objective.  So he imposed, to some extent, his personality on that I think.  
And there was some discussion with the remuneration committee as to whether or 
not he should.  But I think if the individual doesn't buy into them it's quite difficult.  
But with [new CEO] coming in I think he was more open to more detailed personal 
objectives.   
HR professional 
 
Thus the impact of the individual and his/her personal preferences can be an important 
influence on remuneration practices. 
 
Improving the schemes for HR reasons 
In a similar manner to scheme changes for strategic reasons, some schemes were changed 
because they were not in line with good HR practice, and so the protagonists made 
improvements.  In several instances schemes were changed to reduce the level of 
complexity, as there was no direct line of sight from performance to incentive. 
I couldn't understand it!  As a senior executive, and a participant, and someone who 
was supposed to administer and advise on it, it was completely incomprehensible.  I 
was to learn later on that it showed no signs of generating any positive outcomes for 
people, which it didn't as far as I can see.  But to me it might have been as well have 
been written in classical Greek, 'cos it made no sense. 
HR professional 
 
The comment above related to a particularly complex ltip.  However, such comments 
were also made in relation to some schemes that rewarded total shareholder return (TSR).  
TSR is generally measured as the combined dividend and capital return to shareholders 
over a particular period of time (often three years), and is rewarded as a relative measure 
rather than an absolute.  A company’s TSR will be benchmarked against the median of its 
index or a peer group:  performance below median will attract no award;  performance 
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above median will mean that a progressively larger percentage of the ltip shares vests, 
until performance in, say, the upper quartile leads to full vesting.  This means that the 
executives’ final payout depends not only on their own performance but on that of 
competitors.  Also, as TSR involves a complex series of calculations, it means that they 
cannot easily determine how they are doing on this performance measure.  That lack of 
sight of the end result, and the complex and sometimes doubtful link between business 
performance and share price performance, has led some companies to move away from a 
TSR measure on the basis that measures without a clear line of sight have less 
motivational effect for employees (McLaughlin, 1991). 
 
 
Corporate governance reasons for changing schemes 
Some companies changed their schemes in order to come in line with what was seen as 
best practice from a governance perspective.  This was particularly common in the mid-
1990s (prior to this research), following the Greenbury and Myners reports in 1995: 
At the time... we had a share option scheme from about 1990, and that ran until 
about 1995.  And then Greenbury, general concern about fat cats and so on, and the 
chief executive of the day, with the remuneration committee, decided that the option 
scheme was out of favour and it was not something we should continue to operate.  
Even though it did have in the latter days some specific performance targets.  So 
they introduced the restricted share plan instead. 
Company secretary 
 
However, governance issues are still an important driver of change: 
Coming into line with best practice in remuneration policy terms as viewed by the 
ABI and the DTI and everybody else who had a view on this.   
HR professional 
 
The influence of the institutional shareholders, and of regulation generally, is significant 
in this field.  In at least one instance, a remuneration committee had changed the 
performance measures on the annual bonus scheme to be more compliant with ‘best 
practice’, despite the fact that an interviewee believed that the existing scheme was more 
appropriate for the company.    
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Although some companies made change to their schemes for ‘good governance’ reasons, 
such as the performance measures change above, or removing a re-testing of performance 
conditions on options, it is important to note that others were in breach of such 
provisions, and did not change in order to comply.  Instances that were not changed 
included two companies where bonuses were partly pensionable, and two companies 
where there was no performance condition on the bonus match.  Both of these practices 
are frowned upon by investors.  
 
One question asked of the respondent focus group was why some companies made 
changes to comply with good governance, and others did not.  Two explanations were 
given.  One was that companies needed to “think for themselves” and in a ‘comply-or-
explain’ governance regime might ignore best practice if they believed it inappropriate.  
The other explanation was that companies “decide what they want to fight on” – they 
comply with trivialities, and then feel able to defend practices that they believe are 
important.   
 
Other environmental reasons for scheme changes 
At the time of the research fieldwork, debate was underway about whether financial 
reporting standards should be amended to mandate a charge against profits to reflect 
share options.  Discussions with the interviewees about this indicated that they did not 
expect to change their practices because of this potential accounting change, as there was 
no fundamental economic change being made.  However, the subsequent remuneration 
report of one of the case companies, relating to a period after the interviews, indicated 
that they had stopped issuing options and moved instead to share-based schemes.  This is 
in line with research by Deloitte and Touche (2004) which showed that 10% of FTSE 100 
and 8% of FTSE 250 companies have ceased using their executive option schemes, whilst 
others have scaled back the number of options awarded.  Other long-term schemes have 
been introduced, presumably to compensate for this. 
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5  Discussion 
The decision by remuneration committees to set or to change their executive 
remuneration policies and packages echoes the tension faced by NEDs in their broader 
duties – the potential conflict between performance and conformance.  Remuneration is 
an HR matter, and remuneration schemes need to be able to motivate executives to 
perform in a way suited to the business needs.  At the same time, remuneration is a 
governance matter, and remuneration committees must demonstrate compliance with 
good practice.  These two sets of objectives can be in conflict, but both can lead to 
increases in pay. 
 
This conflict between objectives is most clearly seen in the way in which the case 
companies made changes to their remuneration policies and packages in order to change 
schemes that were not paying out.  Taking a strict governance line, an agency theory 
perspective frowns upon such practices, as the whole point of the remuneration contract 
is to align executives with shareholders, and it could be argued that a scheme that pays 
out regardless of performance is unlikely to do this.  Indeed, this moral hazard argument 
was put forward by Hudson and Pichler (2004:  103), who stated that a “package that is 
renegotiated every year undermines the pay-to-performance relation and thus the very 
nature of an incentive contract”.  However, looking at remuneration as a means to 
enhance performance, through the lens of expectancy theory, it is clear that in order to be 
motivated the executive must see the targets as achievable, and believe that by achieving 
the relevant performance measures s/he will receive the reward.  From this perspective, 
changing a ‘non-performing’ scheme makes sense.   
 
In discussing this pay-performance link, Gillan (2001) suggested that the relationship was 
asymmetrical:  executive pay was only performance-related when performance was good, 
but companies focused instead on peer comparisons when it was poor.  This does seem to 
be reflected in the results of this research.  In a similar vein, Garvey and Milbourn (2003) 
notes that executives were less affected by ‘bad luck’ reducing their pay than they were 
by ‘good luck’ increasing it.  This too is shown in this research:  no instance was found of 
a company reducing awards due to their being in excess of what was expected. 
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 At first sight, this might appear to be an instance of ‘fat cattery’, with executives having 
large elements of PRP and schemes being manipulated to ensure payout.  However, it 
should be noted that this phenomenon is not limited to executives.  There are various 
examples in the literature of schemes being changed for lower level employees for 
exactly this reason.  For example, Gerhart and Rynes (2003:  173) discussed an incentive 
pay programme at DuPont which was considered a great success whilst it was paying out, 
and had to be terminated due to employee discontent when the company could not pay 
due to poor results.  They also cited a similar outcome with the PRP scheme at Saturn.  
Similarly, Lewis (1998: 68) suggested a feedback loop in his PRP process cycle, such 
that underperformance may lead to a decrease in performance targets4.  It thus appears 
that in many levels of the hierarchy, PRP is only considered workable when the schemes 
produce a reward.   
 
Even disregarding this particular need to change schemes that did not pay out, many 
other changes were made to schemes in the case companies, reflecting either a 
performance or a conformance need.  For example, following ‘market practice’ led to 
continued increases in the elements of pay, viz the base salary, the bonus multiple and the 
multiples of salary relating to long-term schemes.  Given the need that runs through 
governance regulation (for example Greenbury, 1995;  Combined Code, 2003), and the 
HR literature (for example Lawler, 1987;  Kessler, 1993) for remuneration to “attract, 
retain and motivate”, then meeting market rates is a reasonable thing to do.  The ever-
increasing levels of pay could be seen as just a side-effect of this need to retain good 
people in an environment where pay rates are widely published.  The problem faced by 
NEDs on the remuneration committee is how to determine where ‘the market’ lies.  This 
problem was raised in the Greenbury report (1995:  6.4), which  noted that within market 
parameters, the remuneration committee had a wide range of discretion in setting pay 
levels and forms. 
 
                                                 
4 He also suggested that overachievement would lead to an increase in performance targets.  This was not 
noted in the case companies. 
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Furthermore, given that the governance environment is constantly changing (Taylor, 
2004) and that companies strategies are continually evolving, it is not surprising that the 
case companies made so many changes in their pay schemes.  Nor is it necessarily 
surprising that these changes were generally in the favour of the executives or, at best, 
neutral.  Murphy discussed this, commenting that remuneration committees do not 
necessarily comprise cynical members “rubber-stamping increasingly lucrative pay 
programs with a wink and a nod”.  He commented that:  
judgement calls tend systematically to favour the CEO.  Faced with a range of 
market data on competitive pay levels, committees tend to error on the high side.  
Faced with a choice between a sensible compensation plan and a slightly inferior 
plan favored by the CEO, the committee will defer to management.  Similarly, faced 
with  a discretionary choice on a bonus-pool funding, the committee will tend to 
over- rather than under-fund.  The amounts at stake in any particular case are 
typically trivial from a shareholder's perspective, but the overall impact of the bias 
has likely contributed to the ratcheting of pay levels… (1999:2518) 
 
Examination of Table 4, which sets out the reasons given for changing schemes and the 
changes that resulted shows that companies consistently saw the change stimuli as being 
a reason to amend their long-term schemes.  In some instances these were minor 
amendments;  in others they were more significant.  Given that these long-term schemes 
are put in place to focus executives’ minds on the companies’ longer-term performance, 
regular changes to schemes or measures could lead to less clarity.  Generally, the ‘long-
term’ is taken to be three years, and a new scheme award is made each year.  Thus an 
executive could easily be in the situation of trying to manage two different sets of 
objectives for two schemes that are running concurrently – one to end next year and one 
the year after.  (It is unlikely, although not impossible, that a company would make 
significant changes to long-term schemes in three consecutive years, as this might lead to 
friction with institutional investors.) 
 
This research has shown that the case companies made many changes to their 
remuneration policies and packages.  These changes related to the levels of salary and 
performance-related award, as well as to the structure of the different types of pay 
scheme.  Changes were made for reasons to do with a company’s strategy and the need to 
follow best HR practice, as well as the need for good governance.  Individual changes 
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could be justified in the light of each company’s circumstances, but their overall effect 
was to increase pay or pay potential in the subject companies. 
 
 
5  Conclusions 
This paper sets out the results of interview-based research with the protagonists in the 
remuneration-setting decision in 12 FTSE 350 companies.  It describes the ways in which 
these remuneration committees made changes to their executive remuneration schemes, 
and the reasons behind such changes.  The changes were made to the level of fixed 
salary, and to each element of variable pay:  performance measures and targets, scheme 
parameters and the schemes themselves.  Almost all of the changes led to, or had the 
potential to lead to, increases in executive pay.  Thus they explain, for a small group of 
companies, the ever-increasing levels of executive pay commented upon by, amongst 
others, Ezzamel and Watson (2002). 
 
The findings of the study have been interpreted through two theoretical lenses.  
Following an agency theory approach it can be seen that remuneration policies have 
become more performance-related, both with new schemes brought in, and with increases 
to the actual and potential levels of payout.  Changes to performance measures and 
targets to reflect revised corporate strategy and culture also reflect an agency theory 
approach, having the potential to align executives to corporate and shareholder needs.  
However, the perceived need of remuneration committees to change schemes that do not 
pay out as much as anticipated is antithetical to agency theory, as it can destroy this 
alignment.   
 
The scheme changes to ensure payout make sense using an expectancy theory 
explanation, whereby the executives need to believe that they can meet the required 
targets, and obtain a reward worth having.  Thus, even through this leads to moral hazard, 
such scheme changes make sense in a broader view of the organisation.  NEDs are aware 
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of this tension, but have to balance their monitoring role, enforcing ‘good governance’, 
and their performance role, helping to ensure that executives are motivated to work for 
the benefit of the company. 
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Table 1  Company interviewees by role 
 
Co. 
HR 
professional 
Remuneration 
Committee 
chairman 
 
NED 
 
Consultant 
 
CEO 
Company 
secretary 
Company 
chairman 
 
Total 
1 2 1 1 1 1   6 
2 1 1 1 1 1   5 
3 1       1 
4 1 1   1   3 
5 1  1 1  1 1 5 
6 2       2 
7 1 1 2 1 1 1  7 
8 1   1    2 
9 1       1 
10 1       1 
11      1  1 
12  1      1 
Total 12 5 5 5 4 3 1 35 
 
 
Table 2   Summary of changes made to remuneration schemes 
Change Number of companies to which this relates 
Long term incentive scheme changed. 10 
Nature of the annual bonus scheme changed. 6 
Long term performance measures changed.  6 
Level of bonus target and/or cap increased.   5 
Salary levels increased by considerably more than market trend. 4 
Short term performance measures changed. 4 
Bonus deferral and/or share match introduced to the package. 4 
Perks improved.  1 
Introduced a shareholding requirement for executives. 1 
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Table 3   Summary by company of the reasons given for changing schemes    
 
 
Company   → 
Reasons      ↓  
 
A B C D E F G H I J K L Total 
Below market   █ █ █  █   █  █ 6 
Not paying 
out[enough]  █  █   █   █ █ █ 6 
Incoming 
execs/ CEO/ 
Chairman 
 █   █  █  █ █  █ 6 
Strategy 
/commercial 
markets 
changed 
 █     █    █ █ 4 
Scheme or 
measure too 
complex 
 █   █      █ █ 4 
Culture change  █     █    █ █ 4 
Best practice / 
market practice 
    █ █ █   █   4 
Change in 
company 
circumstances 
█   █    █ █    4 
Peer group not 
relevant  █         █ █ 3 
Needed better 
short/long term 
balance 
      █     █ 2 
Execs 
dissatisfied  / to 
retain 
executives 
      █     █ 2 
End of scheme 
life   █  █        2 
[May] need to 
attract people       █   █   2 
Retention 
needs       █   █   2 
Other      █ █  █ █   2 
Total 1 6 2 3 5 2 11 1 3 7 5 9  
NB – company designators are changed to disguise their identity. 
 
Table 4   Analysis of changes made and reasons given for the changes 
Changes made   → 
 
 
Reasons   ↓ 
Increase 
in 
salary 
levels 
Change 
Short 
term 
schemes 
Change 
Short term  
performance 
measures 
Bonus 
max 
increased 
/ Higher 
% of pay 
is 
variable 
Bonus 
match 
/share 
match 
introduced 
Change 
long term 
performance 
measures 
Change 
long 
term 
scheme 
Perks 
increased 
Introduced 
shareholding 
requirement 
Currently 
major 
review 
Below market █ █  █ █  █ █   
Not paying 
out[enough]    █ █ █ █   █ 
Incoming execs/ 
CEO/ Chairman █ █ █ █  █ █ █  █ 
Strategy /commercial 
markets changed  █ █ █ █ █ █    
Scheme or measure 
too complex  █    █ █    
Culture change  █ █ █  █ █    
Best practice / 
market practice  █ █ █   █   █ 
Change in company 
circumstances  █   █  █    
Peer group not 
relevant      █ █    
Needed better 
short/long term 
balance 
 █ █ █   █    
Execs dissatisfied  / 
to retain executives █      █    
End of scheme life       █    
[May] need to attract 
people  █  █   █    
   32
Retention needs       █  █  
Other   █ █   █ █    
 
Increase 
in 
salary 
levels 
Change 
Short 
term 
schemes 
Change 
Short term  
performance 
measures 
Bonus 
max 
increased 
/ Higher 
% of pay 
is 
variable 
Bonus 
match 
/share 
match 
introduced 
Change 
long term 
performance 
measures 
Change 
long 
term 
scheme 
Perks 
increased 
Introduced 
shareholding 
requirement 
Currently 
major 
review 
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